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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is widely criticized for poor performance, 
and much of its problem stems from its poor performance in public communications.  
DHS has not been able to earn the respect of the public and local officials, and that means 
that many Americans are not paying attention to important threat warnings and security 
based exercises.  This ultimately means our homeland security is suffering and American 
citizens remain vulnerable to future terror attacks.  This research project considers the 
public communication efforts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by 
analyzing how both the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and National 
Exercise Program (NEP) continually fall short of effectively communicating security 
threats and warnings to the American public.  By looking at two of its highest profile 
projects, HSAS and NEP, we see that the problems are largely the result of DHS taking 
too much of a top-down, federal approach.  This thesis will argue that the highly 
centralized management and execution of both the HSAS and NEP fail to convey the 
importance of federal efforts to local levels of government and American citizens.  This 
thesis will be a comparative case study of these two programs.  I find that both programs 
are useful and necessary, but both can be improved by decentralizing the national 
exercise framework and communication efforts to local level officials who can better 
tailor information and response efforts pertinent to their communities.  As the most 
important component of disaster relief and response, local level officials, who are 
typically overshadowed by national level personnel, can more effectively utilize federal 
exercise money and communicate threats the American public than DHS personnel can. 
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I. COMMUNICATING HOMELAND SECURITY THREATS: 
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is widely criticized for poor 
performance, and this thesis will argue much of its problem stems from its poor 
performance in public communications.  DHS has not been able to earn the respect of the 
public and local officials, and that means that many Americans are not paying attention to 
important threat warnings and security-based exercises.  This ultimately means our 
homeland security is suffering and American citizens remain vulnerable to future terror 
attacks.  This thesis will consider the public communication efforts of the DHS by 
analyzing how both the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and National 
Exercise Program (NEP) continually fall short of effectively communicating security 
threats and warnings to the American public.  By looking at two of its highest profile 
projects, HSAS and NEP, I find that the problems are largely the result of DHS taking too 
much of a top-down, federal focused approach. 
 Upon the creation of the HSAS in the aftermath of 9/11, at the behest of then 
Homeland Secretary Tom Ridge to consolidate broad public terror alerts, the DHS sought 
to “reduce vulnerability or increase response capability during a period of heightened 
alert.”1  The HSAS quickly developed into the most visible domestic counterterrorism 
tool and subsequently became the main communication link to the American public 
regarding security threats and warnings.  The HSAS functions strictly to stimulate 
citizens to take recommended protective actions commensurate with color-based threat 
levels, but it has been widely criticized, as publicly released information relevant to 
actual threats remains insignificant and generalized, while more informative details 
remain restricted to higher level government officials. 
 In a similar effort to boost public communications for homeland security threats 
and warnings, DHS has instituted the National Exercise Program to “demonstrate that  
                                                 
1 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security, 32 (2007): 123. 
 2
responders have the capacity to respond effectively to an incident, or identify areas in 
which improvement is necessary.”2  National level exercises have been highly criticized 
for the amount of planning, coordination and resources required to simulate and evaluate 
emergency based tests against domestic infrastructure and organizations. 
 This thesis will be a comparative case study of the HSAS and National Exercise 
Program to answer one broad question with two underlying arguments.  The question is, 
why has the DHS, considering all its resources and internal agencies, continually 
struggled to effectively communicate homeland security threats to the American public?  
I argue that DHS has failed to create public interest and spark citizen engagement as a 
result of repeatedly releasing limited and generalized threat information during crisis and 
periods of heightened alert.  I also argue that the public has lost confidence in 
government efforts to provide adequate warning and protection due to the continuous 
stream of probing attacks against the U.S. homeland.  I find that both programs are useful 
and necessary, but both can be improved by decentralizing the national exercise 
framework and communication efforts to local level officials who can better tailor 
information and response efforts pertinent to their communities. 
 This thesis argues that the highly centralized management and execution of both 
the HSAS and NEP fail to convey the importance of federal efforts to local levels of 
government and American citizens. As the most important component of disaster relief 
and response, local level officials, who are typically overshadowed by national level 
personnel, can more effectively utilize federal exercise money and communicate threats 
the American public than DHS personnel can.  Ultimately, DHS needs to improve its 
public relations with both local level responders and the American public.  Improved 
public communications and the decentralization of federally driven security efforts can be 
achieved by candidly communicating threat warnings and specific information during 
times of crisis. 
                                                 
2 R. E. Petersen, et al., Homeland Emergency Preparedness and the National Exercise Program: 
Background, Policy Implications, and Issues for Congress (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information 
Center, 2008), 2. 
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B. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH EFFORTS 
 Effective communication policies are necessary to secure public opinion in efforts 
to continue building strong federal response capabilities and secure the homeland from 
future threats.  The ability of the DHS to communicate with citizens and ultimately 
convince them to take security-related actions that are worth the economic costs and 
personal inconvenience is critical to crisis management efforts.  A certain level of trust 
must accompany the authority vested in elected and politically appointed officials, 
however, the evidence supports a lack of trust, as only 29 percent of Americans admit 
they would follow evacuation orders and 27 percent claim they typically would not 
comply with federal instructions.3  As quoted in Michael Perini’s Public 
Communications, Abraham Lincoln remarked, “Public sentiment is everything.  With it, 
nothing can fail.  Without it nothing can succeed.”4 
 This analysis will demonstrate how the use of national media outlets by the 
Department of Homeland Security during times of crisis can be strategically valuable and 
advantageous in communicating security threats.  Recent polling data indicate that the 
general public will turn to television and radio as primary sources of information during a 
terror attack.5  The failure of DHS to capitalize on accessible media outlets throughout 
periods of crisis is an advantage lost to the enemy.  The problem with DHS public 
communications is that officials purposely generalize threat information upon release to 
the public.  The lack of specificity and direction helps foster a national climate where the 
potential impact of threats and security concerns remains unknown.  Information about 
emergencies and response should be honest and open, enhancing trust and interaction 
between governing officials and citizens.6  For example, during each of the six times the 
HSAS has ever been elevated from yellow to orange, with some heightened alerts lasting 
                                                 
3 Council for Excellence in Government, “Are we ready? Introducing the public readiness index: a 
survey-based tool to measure the preparedness of individuals, families and communities” (Washington, 
D.C.: 2006), 10. 
4 Michael B. Perini, Public Communications: Vital Link to Maintaining the Public’s Trust During 
Crisis (Ph.D Dissertation, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 213. 
5 R. J. Wray, et al., Theoretical perspectives on public communication preparedness for terrorist 
attacks (Emmitsburg, MD: National Emergency Training Center, 2004), 238.  
6 Ibid., 239. 
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in excess of 29 days, DHS officials initially provided vague threat information to validate 
the threat elevation, but failed to provide specific reasons or information relevant to threat 
levels receding from orange back down to yellow. 
 Our enemies in the war on terror continue to seek victory not through 
overwhelming death and destruction, but rather through influence and causing irreparable 
damage to the national will and public opinion of the American people.  As extremist 
websites continue to promote “invasions of the U.S. media” and declare “media wars 
parallel to military wars,”7 U.S. government agencies charged with security must 
acknowledge that appropriate and meaningful communication of homeland security 
threats can preemptively benefit preparedness and response efforts.  
 In efforts to provide timely and accurate information to the public, the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review promotes the use of social networking 
technologies and various instant communication capabilities to promote widespread 
situational awareness.8  Utilization of cutting-edge technology and instantaneous 
connectivity can make it easier to spread a message or alert, but technology cannot 
address the more important, underlying difficulty: formulating an acceptable and 
actionable message for public consumption.   
 The importance of reviewing the National Exercise Program in assessing public 
communications efforts is evident in the continuous debate over the regional impact and 
security progress being made at a sizeable expense to the American taxpayer. In planning 
for 2007’s National Level Exercise, then-governor of Arizona Janet Napolitano rebutted 
her DHS predecessor by indicating that the estimated $20 million exercise, which was 
intended to involve over 26,000 participants, was “too expensive, too protracted, and too 
removed from a real-world scenario.”9  By attempting to create all-inclusive, overarching 
exercises that demand multi-jurisdictional compliance and costly commitments, DHS is 
missing an opportunity to work with and better engage local level responders in efforts to 
                                                 
7 Michael B. Perini, Public Communications: Vital Link to Maintaining the Public’s Trust During 
Crisis (Ph.D Dissertation, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 207. 
8 Quadrennial homeland security review report: A strategic framework for a secure homeland 
(Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 62.   
9 Spencer S. Hsu, “Disaster drills' future may be put to the test; National exercises could be scaled 
back,” (Op-Ed), The Washington Post, April 2, 2010, A1.  
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standardize equipment, procedures and capabilities.  Exercising the capabilities of the 
nation’s response forces is a visible form of communication with the American people 
that displays our abilities to meet and overcome homeland security-related challenges 
along an increasing spectrum of threat possibilities.   
 This research will examine the evolution of the National Exercise Program and 
ascertain whether the expanding costs and resources required are proportional to our 
national response proficiency and actual domestic security.  Additionally, in order to 
further analyze public perception and involvement in homeland security, this research 
will continue beyond the evolution of the National Exercise Program and focus on the 
political, economic and even demographic influence in selected exercise areas around the 
country.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 A majority of the public maintains a general lack of trust in government agencies 
to provide actionable warning and protection.  This problem is further compounded by 
both the public disinterest in homeland security affairs and a public failure to seek out 
published government emergency resources.  One recent study concluded that two out of 
five Americans are not sure whether or not their local government has an emergency or 
disaster plan for their community and nearly one-third say they do not have an emergency 
alert system in their community.10  Additionally, just 16 percent of adults say they have 
heard about Ready.gov at the national level.11  This thesis argues that the problem of 
public distrust and disengagement can be best addressed by pushing information down to 
the state and local levels. 
 Ownership of threat information at the federal level is significant, as it centralizes 
power within government agencies and prevents any meaningful degree of public 
engagement.  Various forms of evidence exist that demonstrate that during times of crisis 
the public retains a strong desire for threat information beneficial to response efforts at 
                                                 
10 Council for Excellence in Government, “Are we ready?” 7. 
11 Ibid., 8.  (Ready is a national public service advertising (PSA) campaign designed to educate and 
empower Americans to prepare for and respond to emergencies including natural and man-made disasters. 
The goal of the campaign is to get the public involved and ultimately to increase the level of basic 
preparedness across the nation). 
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the lowest levels.  I hypothesize that decentralizing specific threat information will 
further engage local responders who have the potential to make the biggest impact under 
emergency circumstances. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 DHS efforts to communicate homeland security threats to the American public 
can be segregated into “verbal” and “physical activity” communications.  Verbal 
communications encompass the act of alerting the public with information prior to and 
during times of crisis via a wide range of capabilities to include conference calls, 
telecommunications systems and press releases.  Physical activity communications for 
the purposes of this research will refer to the planning and exercises conducted that 
visually display for the public the unified response capabilities and overall preparedness 
of government agencies.  
1. Verbal Communications 
 Scholarly work by Jacob N. Shapiro, Dara Kay Cohen, Randall A. Yim, and 
Shawn Reese has focused on the credibility of government communication efforts and 
argues that vague and unspecific information continues to undermine the importance of 
threats to the homeland.  Current research identifies a growing perception disparity 
relative to demographics and population density.  The most densely populated areas feel 
that the government is appropriately allocating resources and protecting high value 
infrastructure, while rural communities remain skeptical of federal officials and doubt 
that adequate resources have been provided.  Instead, rural communities have come to 
trust and rely on local officials over federal agencies. 
 Shapiro and Cohen focus on the federalized U.S. system of government and lay 
blame on its inability “to motivate actors to take costly protective measures.”12 Their 
main assertion is predicated on the assumption that in federal systems national leaders 
cannot compel protective actions by setting an alert level; they must convince constituent 
                                                 
12 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security, 32 (2007): 121. 
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governments and private parties that the desired actions are worth the costs.13  
Furthermore, Shapiro and Cohen approach the public communication efforts of DHS, 
more specifically the Homeland Security Advisory System, from the perspective that it  
has been a continual failure since inception in 2002.  They contend that the system has 
failed to generate substantial public confidence and they do not assume any public trust in 
government to share meaningful information.   
 Similarly, Reese argues that the vagueness of threat warning and alerts has 
undermined public confidence in government and interest in homeland security affairs.  
He notes, “DHS has never explained the sources and quality of intelligence upon which 
the threat levels were based.”14  Reese argues there are considerable financial, economic 
and social costs associated with threat level changes.  Adjusting the threat level in 
conjunction with the color-coded scale has significant impact not only to the individual 
citizen, but also to that citizen’s family, job, and community.  He says: “These costs 
include the increased security measures undertaken by states and localities, loss to 
tourism, and the indirect cost on the economy during a period of heightened threat 
level.”15 
 Yim also presents a perspective that the public’s perception of the threat can be 
affected by the content and method of public warning.  He notes: “Without adequate 
threat information, the public may ignore the threat or engage in inappropriate actions, 
some of which may compromise rather than promote the public’s safety.”16  Yim argues 
that despite the resources available to DHS, the validity of the message remains the focal 
point.  He reiterates that “public warning systems should, to the extent possible, include 
specific, consistent, accurate, and clear information on the threat at hand, including the 
                                                 
13 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security, 32 (2007): 121. 
14 Shawn Reese, “Homeland Security Advisory System Possible Issues For Congressional Oversight,” 
Congressional Research Service, RL32023 (2005), 5.  
15 Ibid., 12. 
16 R. A. Yim, Homeland security: Risk communication principles may assist in refinement of the 
Homeland Security Advisory System testimony, GAO-04-538 (Washington, D.C: U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2004), 9. 
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nature of the threat, location, and threat time frames.”17  He claims that attempts to 
regionalize national level warnings and alerts can be damaging for surrounding localities 
desiring information necessary to determine indirect impacts and posture response forces 
accordingly.   
 Other scholars, however, offer a more positive review of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s efforts to communicate threats to the American public.  In July 
2009, upon receiving a B- from a national commission in efforts to practice greater 
openness of public information so that citizens better understand national threats, Janet 
Napolitano established the Homeland Security Advisory Task Force to assess the 
effectiveness of the color-coded HSAS in informing the public about terrorist threats and 
communicating protective measures within government and throughout the private 
sector.18  Despite reports that no action has been taken with regards to recommended 
changes for the HSAS, the Task Force reported that the HSAS has functioned reasonably 
well for institutions (levels of government and business), yet continues to poorly 
communicate a credible message to the public.  Consequently, it must further be 
considered that the HSAS remains effective within government institutions due to the 
detailed and bureaucratic framework that triggers automatic response activity.  Aside 
from recommended public actions, no unifying framework exists for state and local 
government echelons.  Additionally, the Task Force further supports that the use of color-
coded alerts is sufficiently clear, powerful, and easily understood despite a consensus 
against the public credibility in the HSAS.19  
 Despite Yim’s arguments against the credibility of government efforts and the 
lack of focus on the actual messages delivered, he suggests, “the specific information 
about the location of a threat should be provided to law enforcement agencies throughout 
                                                 
17R. A. Yim, Homeland security: Risk communication principles may assist in refinement of the 
Homeland Security Advisory System testimony, GAO-04-538 (Washington, D.C: U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2004), 9.  
18 B. Graham, and J. M. Talent, Prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism report card: An 
assessment of the U.S. government's progress in protecting the United States from weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation and terrorism, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism, 2010, 14.  
19 Homeland Security Council, Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force Report and 
Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: 2009), 2. 
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the nation – not just to localities that are being threatened.”20  He further contends that by 
exposing all national, state, and local entities to specific threat information, individual 
lower-level governments can determine through self-interest which response capabilities 
may need to be activated.  One clear benefit to this approach, according to Yam, is the 
decreased cost to already strained budgets. 
 Some experts have argued that the use of the HSAS has successfully 
communicated threats to the American public.  As noted above, Wray et al. (2004) 
compiled polling data indicating that the general public turns to television and radio as 
the primary sources of information in a terror attack.21  By capitalizing on highly visible 
media outlets through the simplicity of color-coded alerts, the government has succeeded 
in communicating a threat concern, however unsatisfied the public may become with the 
limited details provided.   
2. Physical Activity Communications 
 According to the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, exercises provide a 
vital tool for homeland security personnel, from the first responders to senior officials, to 
practice operational activities and decision-making processes in a realistic but risk-free 
environment.22  Improved organizational management, joint planning, and 
interoperability of response forces can be attributed to the value of exercises and the 
continual implementation of lesson learned.  But despite the value of training and 
preparedness efforts, experts agree all-inclusive national level exercises have become 
socially and politically unsustainable.  DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano recently declared, 
“the drills have grown into unrealistic, costly and over-scripted productions.”23  She 
continued to further characterize exercises and drills as an “elaborate game rather than 
opportunities for officials to work through problems.”24 Shawn Reese, who is also critical 
of the vagueness of threat information, stresses the impact of exercise-related costs on 
                                                 
20 Yim, Homeland security: Risk communication principles, 18.    
21 Wray, Theoretical perspectives on public communication preparedness for terrorist attacks, 238. 
22 Quadrennial homeland security review report, 70. 
23 Hsu, “Disaster drills' future may be put to the test,” A1. 
24 Ibid., A1. 
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both the government and private sector.  Reese observes: “These costs include the 
increased security measures undertaken by state and localities, loss to tourism, and the 
indirect cost on the economy during periods of heightened threat level.”25   
 In efforts to determine the value and applicability of the National Exercise 
Program, it is important to consider to what extent the exercises are manipulated by 
regulators and for what reasons.  Hsu writes that the predominant fear among emergency 
planners and state officials is that the federal government will cut costs and simplify 
complicated exercise scenarios in order to promote success among participants.26  
Cutting costs is a means to minimize exercise complexity and participation while still 
achieving the mandated objectives, yet many exercise planners translate cost cutting to an 
inability to determine whether the nation is prepared for a disaster or catastrophic attack.  
The goal is to fully exercise the nation’s capabilities and reduce the risk of repeating 
mistakes made after Hurricane Katrina and 9/11.  In 2005, State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP), a DHS entity within the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP), spent approximately $21 million to develop, plan, coordinate, 
conduct and evaluate TOPOFF-3.27  The actual total cost of TOPOFF-3 has yet to be 
determined, as SLGCP does not collect funding information from participating federal 
departments and agencies to determine the total national funding and resources 
involved.28   
 On the other hand, significant literature exists to qualify government exercise 
efforts as beneficial to homeland security and as an effective means of communicating 
with the American public.  Michael Perini defends the seemingly expensive and massive 
TOPOFF program as relevant on the national level because it challenges responders to 
work together through limited-notice, real-time, and multi-jurisdictional exercises for  
 
                                                 
25 Reese, “Homeland Security Advisory System Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight,” 13. 
26 Hsu, “Disaster drills' future may be put to the test,” A1. 
27 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Special 
Reviews, A review of the Top Officials 3 exercise (Washington, D.C.: 2005), 28. 
28 Ibid., 28. 
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state and federal agencies.29  Perini also concludes that balancing the public’s right to 
know with security, safety and privacy issues should be sorted out during exercises and 
not during an actual crisis.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
 This thesis will analyze the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to 
communicate security threats to the American public through a case study examination of 
both the Homeland Security Advisory System and the National Exercise Program.   I will 
use a combination of reports and assessments from Congressional hearings, the 
Homeland Security Digital Library (HDSL) and the Federal Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing (LLIS) network to effectively frame present-day communication efforts.  I will 
draw upon various scholarly articles and publications to identify the most significant 
issues and related arguments.   
 A historical review of the Homeland Security Advisory System will highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses both in its design and implementation as the premier national 
counterterrorism tool.  I will provide evidence that demonstrates the drawbacks to the 
HSAS and reinforces the American public’s desire for increased information, honest and 
clarity. 
 A critical review of the National Exercise Program will determine how present-
day government efforts and selective exercise scenarios are or are not effectively 
communicating the most significant threats to the public.  Statistical data obtained from 
the DHS Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) network will focus on public 
perception, preparedness, and exercise concerns within various levels of government.  
Through an analysis of costs and social impact, this study will also assess how national 
efforts to ensure adequate response capabilities and the protection of citizens have direct 
and indirect effects throughout the country within both communities and industries and 
determine whether the costs of national level exercises outweigh the benefits.   
 Both the Homeland Security Advisory System and the National Exercise Program 
reviews will offer important insight into the historical and current abilities of the 
                                                 
29 Michael B. Perini, Public Communications: Vital Link to Maintaining the Public’s Trust During 
Crisis (Ph.D Dissertation, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 209. 
 12
Department of Homeland Security to communicate threats to the American public.  From 
these assessments, I will conclude this project with an examination of future threat 
communication efforts based largely on the strategic direction available within numerous 
DHS publications and government documents.  Under the widely accepted assumption 
that terrorism will remain the most significant threat to national security, I will also gauge 
the future significance of terrorism and its continual evolution as a government 
responsibility or an inflated public concern.    
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
 This thesis will address the abilities of the Department of Homeland Security to 
effectively communicate security threats to the American public.  After this introductory 
chapter, Chapter II will examine the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) in 
terms of verbal communication.  The HSAS analysis will focus on national and regional 
communication efforts coupled with credibility concerns and public perception of 
government efforts.  An analysis of the historical development of the Homeland Security 
Advisory System will identify the most significant drawbacks and propose policy 
adjustments that may clarify communication efforts. 
 The next chapter will analyze the National Exercise Program in terms of physical 
activity communication and will concentrate on understanding how social, economic and 
perhaps even political concerns often compromise readiness by altering or interfering 
with established exercise plans.  It remains essential for exercises to inspire public 
confidence and demonstrate appropriate national response capabilities, however, costs 
and applicability must also be considered. 
 In Chapter IV I conclude by arguing that public relations will remain central to 
successful crisis management within DHS.  I will analyze how both public 
communication efforts and the decentralization of federal security exercises will 
contribute to DHS' implementation of what it calls the Homeland Security Enterprise, 
which is the aggregation of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and 
private-sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities who share a 
common national interest in the safety and security of America and the American 
population.  The implementation of the Homeland Security Enterprise will be the initial 
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step towards an increasingly decentralized information-sharing network in which the 
contributions of local officials become more relevant and private citizens seize the 
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II. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM 
 In March of 2002, when the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was 
created and initially implemented, the concerns were clear: communicate homeland 
threats to the public and government agencies in a manner that best prevents, mitigates, 
and prepares essential services to respond to terrorist attacks.  Throughout its eight-year 
history, the HSAS has come under fire for its applicability, credibility with the public, 
and ultimately its relevance in the grand strategy of American survival in an age of 
terrorism.  The original goal of the HSAS was to make the American public aware of 
potential threats to the homeland.  Present day security environments demand regional 
communication of relevant information to empower local governments and American 
citizens to implement threat solutions pertinent to their perceived level of risk.  This 
chapter contends that despite the simplicity of the current tiered threat level approach, 
appropriately utilized and regionally communicated threat information would benefit 
society far beyond today’s generalized national color-coded threat assessment. 
 This chapter will review the creation and national implementation of the 
Homeland Security Advisory System and analyze the growing debate among elected 
officials, scholars and citizens regarding its usefulness and validity in an age of constant 
terror threats and population vulnerability.  An operational overview of the HSAS will 
highlight its historical significance during threat periods and critique its ability to 
communicate meaningful threat information to the American public.  Lastly, this chapter 
will analyze the drawbacks and weaknesses of the HSAS in efforts to identify useful 
recommendations to improve public communication and public interest in Homeland 
Security threats.  
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF HSAS 
 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3) created the Homeland 
Security Advisory System (HSAS) in the aftermath of 9/11 to consolidate broad public 
terror alerts in accordance with recommendations from Tom Ridge, the first Department 
of Homeland Security Secretary.  The Department of Homeland Security sought to 
 16
“reduce vulnerability or increase response capability during a period of heightened 
alert.”30  The HSAS was initially proposed by the President’s Office of Homeland 
Security (OHS), the predecessor to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), yet the 
early responsibility for implementing and managing the advisory system fell within the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Attorney General. The HSAS was eventually realigned within the 
administrative control of DHS and quickly developed into the most visibly recognizable 
domestic counterterrorism tool, becoming the main communication link with the 
American public for warnings and security threats.31   
 The HSAS was designed as an all-encompassing security communication tool 
dependent on information collected from state and local first responders, business 
leaders, and the public at large.  Within a year of establishment, Secretary Tom Ridge 
told reporters that he believed the system needed to be further refined and that he was 
worried about the credibility of the system since the public had started questioning the 
authenticity of HSAS threat levels.32  The HSAS continues to receive significant 
criticism from local officials for administering broad national threat warnings and failing 
to directly engage the most at risk American citizens with threat specific information.  
The original intentions of the HSAS were to create a common operational vocabulary, 
context, and communication structure to better understand national threats and the 
appropriate responses to those threats.  As a result of poor national risk communication, 
the complacency and uncoordinated responses of first responders at the state and local 
levels has perpetuated the transformation of the HSAS into a risk management system 
intent on determining the probability of an attack and its potential significance. 
 The Homeland Security Advisory System includes a five color-coded threat level 
system (see Figure 1) that combines threat information with vulnerability assessments in 
efforts to communicate with the American public and safety officials. The HSAS serves 
to aid in the implementation of scaled protective measures and reduce the overall 
                                                 
30 “Homeland Security Advisory System,” Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, March 11, 
2002. 
31 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security, 32 (2007): 121. 
32 Shawn Reese, “Homeland Security Advisory System Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight,” 
Congressional Research Service, RL32023, (2005), 5. 
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likelihood of a terrorist attack.  “The advisory system characterizes appropriate levels of 
vigilance, preparedness, and readiness in a series of graduated threat conditions.”33 
 A majority of Americans remain unaware that the HSAS is actually comprised of 
additional components beyond the highly visible color scheme that DHS relies on to 
communicate with citizens and public safety officials.  In addition to the color-coded 
threat level system, the HSAS also contains homeland security threat advisories and 
homeland security information bulletins.  Threat advisories claim to contain actionable 
information about an incident and the potential targeting of critical infrastructure or other 
national networks.  Information bulletins differ from threat advisories because they focus 
on communicating information unrestricted by timeliness or specificity found in threat 
messages to components of national infrastructure.  Despite their designed intentions of 
reaching out to state and local level officials with specific threat information and 
protecting critical infrastructure, both bulletins and advisories have been criticized for 
failing to provide truly actionable information.  For example, the most specific advisory 
that has ever been made public was released on August 1, 2004 during a threat level 
change from yellow-to-orange, simply stating that financial sectors in New York, New 
Jersey, and Washington D.C., were potential targets of terror attacks.   
This afternoon, we do have new and unusually specific information about 
where al-Qaeda would like to attack. As a result, today, the United States 
government is raising the threat level to Code Orange for the financial 
services sector in New York City, Northern New Jersey and Washington, 
D.C.34 
 Another aspect of the HSAS is the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), 
which provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary during threat periods on 
matters related to Homeland Security.  The HSAC is comprised of state and local 
government leaders, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia.  Per 
its official charter, the HSAC shall be composed of not more than 26 members and a 
number of voting ex officio members who are appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of, 
                                                 
33 Roger L. Kemp, "Homeland security: common sense measures to safeguard your community". Fire 
and Arson Investigator, 2009, 34. 
34 Tom Ridge, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge Regarding Recent Threat 
Reports,” August 1, 2004. 
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the Secretary for specified terms as defined by the Secretary.35  Individuals appointed to 
the HSAC are responsible for recommendations and advice pertaining to Homeland 
strategy, policy, leadership, coordination, management, implementation, evaluation and 
feedback.  
 After consulting with the HSAC, the Secretary of Homeland Security determines 
whether to raise or lower the HSAS threat level.  DHS officials then proceeds to notify all 
governors, state homeland security advisors and mayors of selected cities via conference 
calls to inform them that the threat level has been changed.  “Following the first 
conference call and electronic notification via the National Law Enforcement 
Telecommunications System (NLETS), DHS makes a second conference call to as many 
state and local law enforcement associations as can be reached.”36  Under the current 
communication architecture, the HSAS positions the local level responders, who typically 
play the most significant role in a crisis, at the end of all communication efforts.  
Evidently it is not protocol for DHS to communicate threat level adjustments to all state 
and local officials as some claim and have testified that they have never been officially 
notified.  For example, “On April 30, 2003, Jeffery Horvath, chief of the Dover Delaware 
police department told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that his department 
has never received any official notification of a change of HSAS threat condition and has 
relied on the news media for this information.”37  Also, Michael J Chitwood, Chief of the 
Portland Maine Police Department testified that he once received official notification of a 
threat level change from state authorities eight hours after implementation. 
 In response to increasing criticism, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano established 
the Homeland Security Advisory Task Force in July 2009 in an effort to assess the 
effectiveness of the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System.  In addition to 
assessing HSAS, other objectives of the task force were to gauge DHS ability to inform 
the public about terrorist threats and communicate protective measures within the private 
                                                 
35 “Homeland Security Advisory Council Charter,” February 2009, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_Charter. 
36 Reese, “Homeland Security Advisory System Possible Issues For Congressional Oversight,” 3. 
37 Ibid., 8.  
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sector and government agencies.38  As of January 2010, the national level commission on 
the prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism reported that the recommendations of 
the task force, appointed by the DHS Secretary, largely remained unimplemented and that 
critical opportunities to reengage the American public and further develop an informed 
citizenry have been missed.39 
 Arguably, the HSAS has succeeded at informing government agencies and federal 
responders, which bureaucratically operate along predetermined courses of action, yet has 
increasingly failed to attract public interest and communicate relevant information to the 
local levels.  In contrast to national level administrators, local level responders are 
concerned with efficiently applying limited resources to threats in a particular area vice 
addressing an entire region or state without prioritized concerns or pertinent threat 
information.  A survey for the Gilmore Commission Report, a product of the RAND 
National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) found that 60 to 80 percent of local and state 
organizations wanted more specific information on the type of incident, location, and 
time period of the threat.40 
 By examining Reese’s Table 2 – Homeland Security Advisory Threat Level 
Changes (see Figure 2), it is significant to understand that since inception, the HSAS has 
never operated at the green threat level and only elevated to orange eight times.  
Anticipated flight bombings originating in the United Kingdom in August of 2006, 
marked the only instance in which the threat level has been raised to red (severe risk).  
The security measures and protective action associated with the red threat level were 
strictly limited to airline operations.  Three days later the HSAS lowered the threat level 
to orange and has since maintained the high threat for all international flights. 
                                                 
38 B. Graham and J. M. Talent, “Prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism report card An 
assessment of the U.S. government's progress in protecting the United States from weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation and terrorism,” Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism (U.S.) 2010, 14.  
39 Ibid., 14. 
40 “Forging America’s New Normalcy:  Securing Our Homeland, Protecting Our Liberty,” Gilmore 
Commission: Fifth Annual Report to Congress, RAND Corporation (2003), D-7.2. 
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Figure 2.  Homeland Security Threat Advisory Threat Level Changes 
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B. WEAKNESSES AND DRAWBACKS 
 Each threat level corresponds to specific protective measures that are mandatory 
for federal agencies, yet provides only recommended actions for the American public.41  
In Color Bind; Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security Advisory System, Jacob N. 
Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen contend that the HSAS can only provide recommended 
actions because it was not designed to generate confidence; rather DHS assumed that the 
public would trust the national leadership and believe in the utility of the system’s 
information. The existing recommended actions lack any authoritative enforcement 
capability and mostly resemble warnings and guidance.  Public opinion polling in 2003 
found that only 57 percent felt that the HSAS provided useful information and only nine 
percent reported making any changes to their daily routines in response to the alerts.42  
According to the Council for Excellence in Government, an independent non-profit 
organization, the Public Readiness Index is a survey-based tool used to measure the 
preparedness of individuals, families, and communities.  Of those surveyed, almost half 
have not thought about preparing for an emergency, 34 percent do not think an 
emergency will happen to them or their family and 25 percent think that nothing they can 
do would be effective.  Twenty-one percent say that not knowing what to do is a major 
reason for their lack of preparedness, 18 percent say it takes too much time, and 16 
percent say it costs too much money.43  The absence of specific threat information has 
perpetually eroded the trust required to motivate and engage American citizens.  “Two 
out of five Americans are not sure whether or not their local government has an 
emergency or disaster plan for their community.”44  In communicating threat 
information, the federal government must convince the population that the desired 
                                                 
41 Reese, “Homeland Security Advisory System Possible Issues For Congressional Oversight,” 1. 
42 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security, 32 (2007): 129. 
43 “Are we ready? Introducing the public readiness index: a survey-based tool to measure the 
preparedness of individuals, families and communities,” Council for Excellence in Government.  
Washington, D.C. 2006, 18. 
44  Ibid., 7. 
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protective and responsive actions are worthwhile.45  In order for the HSAS to effectively 
inform the public of homeland threats, citizens must maintain trust in DHS officials and 
uphold the credibility of the threats produced by the system.   
 “Since its inception, critics inside government and out have ridiculed the 
Homeland Security Advisory System for being vague and unhelpful.”46  The credibility 
of the HSAS has been continually undermined as a result of multiple unsuccessful 
Congressional efforts to improve the risk communication capabilities of the system.  “A 
failed fiscal year 2007 DHS authorization bill proposed a color-free alert system that 
would allow for regional and sector specific targets.”47  In addition, repetitive DHS 
authorization bills have further scrutinized operational language and responsibilities of 
DHS officials.  Ironically, American citizens are expected to abide by a terror alert 
warning system that elected officials have repeatedly attempted to dissolve.  The 
following sections highlight various weaknesses and drawbacks associated with the 
HSAS.  Weaknesses are associated with design flaws most notably the all-encompassing 
color schemes that generalize actual threat conditions into broad threat postures.  The 
drawbacks of the HSAS focus more on the disadvantages of actually implementing the 
system as designed.  Numerous bureaucratic challenges surface as officials attempt to 
raise and lower threat color levels and also implement protective measures at the local 
levels that were originally designed for federal agencies. 
1. System Weaknesses 
 The reluctance of the federal government to lower the color alert status after 
threats have subsided leads to public cynicism about the color status and contributes to 
the increasingly disconnected relationship between threat warnings and colors.48  Citizens 
are continually unable to associate and interpret the severity of risk with particular colors.  
                                                 
45 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security, 32 (2007): 121. 
46 Spencer S. Hsu, “US Should Simplify Terror Warning Systems,” The Washington Post, September 
16, 2009, A3.  
47 Tim Starks, “House Panel Considers Security Improvements, Including New Warning System,” 
Congressional Quarterly Today, March 28, 2006. 
48 Homeland Security Council (U.S.). 2009. Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force Report 
and Recommendations. Washington, D.C. 2009, 5. 
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“Homeland Security officials privately acknowledge the many flaws of the system under 
which the threat level was raised from yellow to orange between September 2002 and 
August 2004.”49 Due to the broad-base approach and general recommended actions, the 
HSAS has failed to convey the importance of elevated threat levels across various 
landscapes and population centers.   
 The DHS has published recommended actions for U.S. citizens that are general in 
nature and based solely on preparatory actions that amounts to little more than public 
suggestions.  Arguably, most citizens have never seen or read the recommended actions 
that correspond to particular threat level colors.  This lack of public interest in individual 
protective and preparatory measures can neither be blamed on citizens nor the 
government; however, the typically generalized HSAS threat messages have reduced 
government credibility and continually fail to promote public interest in homeland 
security affairs.   
 The lack of clarity as to what the color levels require is one of the major 
weaknesses in the HSAS.50  Without any specific actionable steps, the color-coded threat 
level system serves only to inform the American public that an incident has occurred or is 
expected to occur which puts the public at risk.  Aside from the visual awareness 
achieved by the HSAS, no other actionable information is provided by the government 
nor are any mandated actions required of the public. 
 The federal government is bureaucratically driven to respond proportionately to 
changes in the national threat level and must implement costly security and preparatory 
measures.  State and local level budgets also incur sizeable costs when threat levels are 
elevated.  “An example of this is the cost of random car searches at Atlanta’s Hartsfield 
airport, which reportedly requires $180,000 a month for labor and signage.  This cost is 
borne by Atlanta’s police department and airport administration without appropriate 
federal reimbursement.”51  Additionally, “a lack of funding, combined with decreasing 
                                                 
49 John Mintz. "DHS Considers Alternatives To Color-Coded Warnings:" The Washington 
Post, May 10, 2005, A6. 
50 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security, 32 (2007): 124. 
51 Reese, “Homeland Security Advisory System Possible Issues For Congressional Oversight,” 13. 
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trust in the system and declining confidence in the information it provided has led to a 
steady decline in the responsiveness of local officials to national alerts.”52  As members 
of large bureaucracies, public officials are constrained to operating along rigid and costly 
federally developed standard operating procedures that involve increased security, 
economic losses to tourism and indirect costs on the economy during periods of 
heightened threat levels.53  The costs associated with HSAS threat level changes 
prompted the United States Conference of Mayors to release a 145-city survey that 
reported that during periods of heightened alert homeland security costs increased to an 
additional $70 million a week.54   
It is unreasonable to impose the costs of the upgraded security precautions 
associated with these alerts on governments and business across the 
country when terrorists cannot strike everywhere at once.  The combined 
total of eleven weeks spent at orange alert since 9/11 has cost cities an 
estimated $750 million in stepped up security measures.  The truth is that 
some targets are much more attractive than others.  A nationwide threat 
alert system makes no sense in a huge country where the level of risk 
varies wildly from place to place.55   
Failure to consistently reevaluate and ultimately reset threat levels according to security 
circumstances can prolong prospective security related costs and perpetually damage 
already strained budgets. 
2. System Drawbacks 
 The most common perceived drawback of the HSAS is the overall vagueness of 
warnings.  Raising and lowering of the terror threat level is a bureaucratic challenge and 
subsequently disseminating the available information as a unified message is also 
difficult as various groups will interpret information in different ways.  Under any given 
scenario or circumstance, DHS is charged with communicating relevant information to 
federal, state, local, and tribal officials while also providing relevant information to 
                                                 
52 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara K. Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security, 32 (2007): 129. 
53 Reese, “Homeland Security Advisory System Possible Issues For Congressional Oversight,” 12. 
54 Ibid., 13. 
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businesses, families, individuals, and the American public-at-large.  Given this 
momentous challenge each time the threat level must be adjusted, it becomes almost 
impossible to specify messages according to national concerns.  This predictable situation 
reinforces the need to establish and rely on a regional approach to threat communication.  
Yim argues that poor communications derived from broad national level warnings and 
advisories create complacency among lower level responders and also contributes to poor 
misallocation of limited and valuable response resources.56 
 An operational drawback to the implementation of the HSAS is that “protective 
measures are provided for each threat condition, but these protective measures are 
identified only for federal agencies.”57  The failure of the HSAS to obligate and only 
recommend protective measures for states and regions, including the public and private 
sectors, has led to the independent development of protective measures unique to 
particular regions and localities.  The flexibility of protective measures within different 
levels of government has caused the Department of Homeland Security to neglect an 
opportunity to enforce a standardized approach to response activities and capabilities.  
Furthermore, the apparent lack of standardization may hinder future joint operations in 
the event of terror attacks that require response participation across multiple jurisdictions 
and levels of government.   
In terms of terms of collaboration, the most common governments that 
cities work with in order of frequency are their state governments, other 
local governments, and regional planning authorities.  What is interesting 
is that the federal government is not near the top of this list.  This is 
echoed in the views of city managers on the information that they receive 
from the federal government; with 32 percent of respondents believing 
that the color-coded homeland security advisory system was ineffective.58 
 The president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, William B. 
Berger, once testified before the Governmental Affairs Committee that the lack of 
                                                 
56 R. A. Yim “Homeland Security Risk Communication Principles May Assist in Refinement of the 
Homeland Security Advisory System,” Testimony, GAO-04-538 T. (Washington, D.C: U.S. General 
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57 Reese, “Homeland Security Advisory System Possible Issues For Congressional Oversight,” 1. 
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defined response protocols for state and local governments was an area of concern among 
local law enforcement agencies.59  The lack of federal mandates and guidance in 
establishing standardized response capabilities provides individual localities the freedom 
to assess and create unique capabilities applicable to individual areas however this may 
reveal regional vulnerabilities during larger joint operations.  Despite the disjointed 
response environment at the state and local level, DHS claims “Ultimately, homeland 
security is about synchronization efforts with multiple partners across the landscape of 
America.”60   
 Minimal attention is given to colors and threat levels because there are no 
required corresponding activities for the public to participate in.  Local level officials, if 
notified by federal officials, are responsible for translating threats and enforcing locally 
driven response efforts.  Even at the local level, officials can implement response 
capabilities within given jurisdictions, but only suggest and recommend that citizens take 
appropriate actions. 
 A major concern in the use of a color coded threat level system void of any true 
responsibility is that despite DHS genuine efforts to communicate a broad national 
message, both press and citizens bypass the color threat level and choose to focus on the 
story behind the threat level change.  Citizens are more concerned with the nature of the 
threat and whether or not it is credible.  In particular, citizens desire relevant information 
pertinent to their personal safety, daily routines, and the continuation of government 
services.  Conversely, the press seeks to exploit the more sensational aspects of security 
threats to attract viewers and critically debate actions taken by responsible government 
officials.  The press also focuses on investigation efforts and the verification of facts and 
figures in efforts to uncover the chain of events as opposed to providing useful 
information that could assist citizens in preparatory or response activities.  For example, 
the disruption of the London terrorist cell on August 10, 2006 caused the terror threat 
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60 President's Homeland Security Advisory Council (U.S.).  Top Ten Challenges Facing The Next 
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level to rise to red for commercial flights inbound to the United States from the United 
Kingdom.61  “The press paid scant attention to the color change, focusing instead on the 
plot itself and on the new rules implemented for carry-on baggage.”62 
 Public communications are further restricted as threat information is typically 
generalized and withheld from the American public for a variety of reasons to include the 
avoidance of civil unrest and national security implications.  The growing skepticism 
surrounding HSAS threat levels is reinforced by public concerns that DHS has never 
explained the sources or quality of intelligence upon which threat levels were based.63  
The HSAS functions strictly to provoke citizens to take recommended protective actions 
commensurate with color based threat levels, yet publicly released information relevant 
to actual threats remains insignificant as more specific information remain restricted to 
higher level government officials.  Improved transparency is necessary for DHS officials 
to succeed at public communications.  The apparent lack of interest and response to the 
recommended actions provided by the HSAS for the American public indicate that 
American citizens are not supportive of general threat information nor are they inclined 
to individually prepare themselves for unknown and unlikely catastrophes.  In order to 
build consensus and response activity, DHS must disclose additional information 
meaningful to average citizens and local level officials. 
 On September 11, 2008, the Homeland Security Advisory Council published the 
Top Ten Challenges Facing the Next Secretary of Homeland Security which advised that 
“As a nation, we cannot protect everything, against all things, at all times, and at all costs.  
Fortress American thinking is an unattainable goal and the wrong national strategy.”64  It 
remains imperative that the public communication efforts of DHS strive to extend this 
message to the American public.  Failure to do so will only further contribute to the 
crumbling credibility of government efforts to secure the homeland.  DHS must also aim 
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to communicate that in opposition to a federally dominated top-down strategy, the 
American public remains the strength behind all security efforts nationwide.  DHS relies 
on a vigilant American public as much, if not greater than the American public relies on 
DHS capabilities and organization.  Fortress America thinking is an acknowledgement on 
behalf of DHS that the challenges associated with protecting America are to 
overwhelming without public support.  Failing to communicate this security partnership 
to even the smallest communities will hinder further coordination efforts and emphasize 
distrust in government.  Lack of trust in government will allow each and every minor 
safety breach or international incident slightly related to homeland security to be 
interpreted as some form of security failure and further stir public fear and discontent 
within the United States. 
C. SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 The Homeland Security Advisory Council determined that public disinterest is at 
the heart of DHS public communications concerns.  This research information suggests 
that methods to improve public interest and confidence include accompanying new alerts 
with actionable steps the public can take, debriefing the nation after threat alerts are 
issued and a focused approach to raising and lowering the alert status.65   
 Of concern to DHS officials is the historical evidence that the green threat level 
indicator (lowest threat level) has become irrelevant, as the United States has never 
operated at a threat level lower than blue - guarded risk.  The Homeland Security 
Advisory Council’s primary recommendations included changing the alert level baseline 
to blue (guarded risk).  Their rationale for resetting the threat level baseline includes 
acknowledging that a post-9/11 world will continuously demand that the United States 
remains guarded and vigilant against terrorism threats and disasters.  In the words of the 
Task Force, “the escalators need to run both ways as it is institutionally difficult for DHS 
to lower the threat level, the Secretary should consider some forcing mechanism by 
which the alert status defaults to “guarded” in the absence of an affirmative override.”66  
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Often the HSAS has operated at yellow – elevated risk level for consecutive years and at 
orange – high risk level for upwards of 98 days.  The tendency for the HSAS to elevate 
and rarely recede to a lower threat level translates poorly to the American public.  
Citizens need to see and know that government actions are providing for a safer and more 
secure country.  By maintaining potentially inflated threat levels, risk adverse DHS 
officials who may or may not be politically motivated, succeed in communicating that 
Americans must live fearful of the unknown and that a list of general recommended 
actions is the only information eligible for public distribution.     
 The American public must be reengaged and more specifically informed 
concerning the circumstances and response efforts before, during and after terrorist 
attacks on the homeland.  Prescribed recommended actions within the DHS Citizens 
Guide provide a strong foundation for public readiness and capability, yet the public level 
of interest coupled with the credibility of the HSAS remain the central issues.  “In federal 
systems, national leaders cannot compel protective actions by setting an alert level; they 
must convince constituent governments and private parties that the desired actions are 
worth the costs.”67  The Homeland Security Advisory Council has also linked the 
existence of the HSAS to risk communications concluding, “an effective risk 
communications system can mitigate the long-term psychological effects of an incident 
on the American citizen, which will help safeguard our democracy against overreaction 
to possible future attacks.”68  
 Another and perhaps the most challenging remedy to the apparent disconnect in 
threat information between the federal government and the American public is to ensure 
that government officials present a clear and politically unified message in times of crisis.  
For example, as the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks approached and terrorism fears 
escalated in the summer of 2002, 10 federal agencies disseminated contradictory 
warnings to different constituencies and the public.69  Additionally, on May 26, 2004, 
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Secretary Tom Ridge, who had sole responsibility for addressing the public about 
terrorism threats, “appeared on several news shows playing down the danger of a terrorist 
strike while Attorney General John Ashcroft simultaneously announced that Al Qaeda 
was almost ready to attack.”70  Blatant contradictions of threat information stemming 
from reputable government sources and even cabinet political appointees severely 
hamper DHS’s ability to communicate with the American public.  Under these politically 
charged and detrimental conditions, the safety of the American public and the DHS 
secretary’s responsibility to communicate risk information becomes secondary to 
potential political gain and posturing.   
 A solution presented by Congress in a 2007 DHS authorization bill argued that 
the elimination of color from the HSAS would reduce public disinterest in threat 
warnings and more appropriately resonate with the American public.  This effort is an 
example of an arbitrary and counterproductive modification to the existing system.  
Regardless of colors, numbers or shapes used, the central issue is and remains translating 
meaningful and useful information to the American public before and during times of 
crisis.   Applicable threat information allows individuals to better understand the practical 
effects of threat warnings and the recommended response activities. 
 The premise of the HSAS promotes the strong connotation that security can easily 
be emplaced during times of crisis and casually removed as threats fail to materialize.  
One alternative to this belief is to manage security matters similarly to how we approach 
safety – as a matter of routine.71  Safety is a constant endeavor in which businesses, 
industries, and even families observe under the recognition of its importance and ability 
to prevent damage and save lives.  Stephen Flynn contends that if we approach our 
national security in the same manner with which we approach safety, then we can 
succeed in more efficiently preparing our nation to mitigate future terrorist attacks.  “Just 
as we tailor preparedness for hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes to the area that are 
most susceptible to them, we need to concentrate our security efforts on the places that 
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are most at risk of a terrorist attack.”72  Congruent to these beliefs, Flynn promotes the 
ability of individual communities to independently determine their levels of risk, 
readiness and how to bear the costs associated with government distributed threat specific 
information.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The February 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review has indicated that 
building and sustaining capability at the community level is essential to meeting 
homeland security strategic aims and realizing our vision for a secure homeland.73  I 
contend that through vague warnings to the American public and local level emergency 
responders, the Homeland Security Advisory System has hindered public trust and 
interest during times of crisis and undermined community involvement essential to strong 
public readiness. 
In an attempt to standardize the threat alert landscape, the Department of 
Homeland security established the HSAS, which has transformed over time into a large 
national risk management system reliant on the trust of the American public.  Scholars 
and government officials alike have remarked that the HSAS was not designed to inspire 
confidence in government and due to questionable management during threat periods; the 
credibility of the HSAS has suffered in the public eye. “Preservation of credibility and 
public confidence are also important considerations in the refinement of the current 
terrorist threat advisory system”74 
The HSAS priority notification structure has also failed to emphasize local level 
responders who are capable of making the biggest impacts within their communities 
during times of crisis.  Improved threat credibility and transparency are vital for DHS to 
reengage the American community and restore public readiness.  In 2008, the President’s 
Homeland Security Advisory Council correctly summarized the inherent nature of the 
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public communication of risk within DHS as: “one of the toughest challenges for the next 
Secretary will be to keep the American public engaged and focused on efforts to prepare 
for any potential domestic or international threat.  Maintaining the political will and 
public support to move forward with necessary, long term efforts to protect the Homeland 
is a challenge for all Americans.”75 
I concur with many of the recommendations offered by the HSAC.  To succeed at 
public communications and rebuild public trust in government efforts it is equally 
important to both provide actionable steps the public can take during a crisis and also 
debrief relevant states, counties and communities after a threat period or incident.  I 
support eliminating the green threat level advisory as Americans have become 
accustomed to the guarded blue level indicative of a general threat of terrorist attack.  To 
assume that public officials and citizens would ever again be comfortable with the green 
threat level and a low risk of terrorist attacks is inconceivable.  Federal officials must 
demonstrate confidence in our national security apparatus by demonstrating the ability to 
raise and subsequently lower threat colors relevant to actual threat conditions.  I support 
reemphasizing and expanding the use of Homeland Security threat advisories and 
information bulletins to reconnect with state and local level officials who have become 
familiar with merely color indicators and gathering crisis information from mainstream 
news media outlets.  The HSAS is an essential system needed to communicate threat 
information to lower levels, yet it must be utilized as designed by incorporating 
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III. NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM 
 As a result of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), the National 
Exercise Program (NEP) provides a framework for prioritizing and coordinating federal, 
regional and state exercise activities, without replacing any department or agency 
exercises.  The NEP allows for various government departments and agencies to align 
their respective exercises under a single comprehensive program.  Annually, one is 
selected from all submitted exercises to become the National Level Exercise (NLE), 
which requires senior level participation from the interagency community.  DHS 
maintains responsibility for the multi-year exercise planning system, yet mandates that 
the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) implements the NEP.  
FEMA satisfies the legal requirements of the DHS enterprise by conducting relevant 
exercises that reinforce training standards, evaluate readiness levels, and support national 
level preparedness.76 
 This chapter will examine the significance of the annual White House directed 
operations-based NLE within the context of DHS public communications efforts.  NLEs 
are an important part of DHS strategy for communicating with and preparing American 
citizens to experience and respond to large-scale terror attacks or natural disasters.  
Persistent drawbacks of the NLE system include a continued focus on scenarios that are 
unlikely to occur, a growing emphasis on federally directed activity, and an inability to 
appropriately communicate security information to the public. 
 Operations-based exercises, which include drills, functional and full-scale 
exercises, are used to validate the plans, policies, agreements, and procedures solidified 
in discussion-based exercises (tabletop exercises).77  As one of three broad categories of 
exercises within the NEP, “NLEs examine the preparation of the government and its 
officers and other officials to prevent, respond to, or recover from threatened or actual 
terrorist attacks, particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction, major 
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disasters, and other emergencies.”78  By addressing the extensive planning, coordination, 
and resources required for NLEs, this chapter will specifically focus on the 15 National 
Planning Scenarios (NPS) and historical NLE exercise operations to include its 
predecessor, Top Official (TOPOFF) Exercises. 
 On any level, exercises are helpful in determining the right balance of safety, 
security and capability; however, this chapter will argue that under the guidance of the 
NEP, NLEs have become increasingly complicated, costly, and unrealistic.  The 
interagency community continues to focus on a wide range of events and catastrophes 
that are unlikely to occur.  To realize actual gains in safety, security and response 
abilities, exercise implementation must be further decentralized to the local levels as 
NLEs fail to encourage the participation of sub-national units of government and is only 
binding on the federal executive branch. 
 Since the inception of Top Official 1 (TOPOFF-1) in May of 2000, Congressionally 
mandated guidance has directed that NLE are conducted every 12 months in efforts to 
address one or more of the 15 National Planning Scenarios. TOPOFF is a national-level 
domestic exercise with an international component, designed to strengthen the nation's 
capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from large-scale terrorist 
attacks involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).79 TOPOFF 1, the initial 
exercise, was a domestic preparedness exercise focused on consequent management of an 
actual chemical, biological, or cyber terrorist event.  “It was the largest exercise of its 
kind to date, involving $3 million in direct costs and much more in indirect costs.”80  The 
following year Dark Winter 2001 was conducted as a tabletop exercise for senior level 
policy makers that involved the virtual release of smallpox in three malls in the United 
States.  TOPOFF 2 was held in 2003 as a Congressionally mandated full-scale national 
terrorism exercise.  “It was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the nation’s domestic 
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incident management capability by exercising the plans, policies, procedures, systems, 
and facilities of federal, state, and local response organizations against a series of 
integrated terrorist threats and acts in separate regions of the country.”81 In contrast to 
TOPOFF 1, the focus of TOPOFF 2 was the detonation of a dirty bomb, which was 
conducted as an open exercise in which participants were made aware of exercise 
conditions prior to the actual exercise and then participated in seminars and roundtable 
discussions.  Also, the associated cost escalated significantly since the original $3 million 
dollar exercise to over $16 million.  TOPOFF 3 was conducted in April of 2005 at an 
even higher cost of $21 million dollars that again simulated a chemical and biological 
attack and included related exercises in the United Kingdom and Canada.  TOPOFF 4 
also focused on a radiological dispersal device attack and was collectively conducted in 
Portland, OR, Phoenix, AZ, Washington, D.C., and for the first time in the U.S. territory 
of Guam.  TOPOFF 5 was suspended in August 2008 due to allegations of contracting 
policy improprieties yet national level exercises continued under the new name: Tier 1 
National Level Exercises.  NLE 2009 developed into a five-day exercise choosing for the 
first time to focus on terrorism prevention and protection as opposed to response and 
recovery.  The challenge for NLE 2009 was to prevent a terrorist from entering the 
United States to carry out additional attacks in the aftermath of a terrorist event outside 
the country.  NLE 10 (Eagle Horizon) was conducted in May of 2010 as a drill focusing 
on continuity of government operations after an improvised nuclear device detonates in a 
major U.S. city.  Likewise, NLE 2011 is planned to involve a terrorist event as is NLE 
2012, which will likely focus on cyber terrorism. 
A. NATIONAL LEVEL EXERCISE: 15 NATIONAL PLANNING 
SCENARIOS 
 The National Planning Scenarios (NPS) are high-consequence threat scenarios 
modeled after potential worst-case terrorist attacks and natural disasters that are designed 
to assess emergency response capabilities.  According to documents available on the 
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FEMA Lessons Learned Information Sharing website (LLIS.gov), the scenarios were 
developed by a federal interagency group led by the Homeland Security Council (HSC) 
to illustrate the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of major events that we 
should prepare for as a nation.82  However, as of February 2010, the DHS Inspector 
General’s Office concluded that “the department is making progress relative to federal 
incident management plans associated with the NPS, but a full set of plans has not yet 
been completed for any scenarios.”83  The multi-year delay has been attributed to the 
time required to implement the Integrated Planning System that guides the federal 
planning process. 
 It remains important to remember that the establishment of the NPS was based on 
an all-hazards approach to safety and national security in an effort to represent a range of 
potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters.  “The objective was to develop a 
minimum number of credible scenarios in order to establish a range of responsive 
requirements to facilitate preparedness planning.”84  Not all potential hazards can be or 
have been addressed.  Scenario planning is constrained only by imagination and 
reinforced by historical data and intelligence.  “The majority of the 15 National Planning 
Scenarios arguably have a relatively low likelihood of occurring, yet the majority receive 
more attention than scenarios based on events that occur with greater frequency, but are 
arguably less sensational.”85 
 According to DHS officials, the National Planning Scenarios (NPS) are “designed 
to focus contingency planning for homeland security preparedness work at all levels of 
government and the private sector.”86  As recently as August of 2010, DHS Secretary, 
Janet Napolitano, released an internal memo to FEMA administrator W. Craig Fugate in 
which she acknowledged that an exercise policy shift was necessary to ensure our ability 
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to enact plans for preventing, responding, and recovering from disasters and acts of 
terrorism.87  In her memo, Secretary Napolitano communicated that she believes “an 
effective exercise program is the cornerstone of our nation’s collective preparedness and 
resilience.”88  Subsequently, she directed a NEP revision designed to incorporate a two-
year progressive exercise program vice annually mandated exercises.  Under her 
direction, each two-year cycle will culminate with a NLE, yet planning and coordination 
efforts will be built around a series of more frequent, smaller-scale drills, tabletop and 
functional exercises designed to meet operational and legal objectives instead of just 
addressing a single catastrophic scenario.  This is a positive change in the federal exercise 
landscape as these adjustments maintain the potential to address previous shortcoming of 
the NPS, which are the basis for NLEs under the NEP.  The frequency of interaction and 
exercises will produce more opportunities for smaller state, local and tribal responders to 
progressively participate with larger more federally bound entities.  The willingness of 
DHS and FEMA to emphasis the smaller proponents of emergency response will support 
national efforts to capitalize on local knowledge, resources, and expertise. 
 Since early 2000, NLE have ranged wildly from notice to no-notice, operational to 
tabletop, domestic to international, and functional to full-scale exercises.  “Multi-year 
planning, stakeholder agreements, and resource management are essential ongoing 
processes that provide the basis for planning, conduct, and evaluation of individual 
exercises.”89  Additionally, exercises have been chaired by various federal departments 
and agencies and have also included relevant infrastructure members of the private 
sector. 
 A review of historical and near term future exercises highlights the significant 
influence that terrorism continues to have on American society.  Congress originally 
required TOPOFF exercises to focus on terrorism, yet the historical preference of NLE 
(second generation TOPOFF) exercises to continue that focus ten years after inception 
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may be the result of the fearful effect that these catastrophic scenarios have on the public.  
However, a simple analysis reveals negligible attention is being paid to natural disasters 
and other lower level more likely to occur scenarios.  Even though three of the fifteen 
national planning scenarios are natural disaster scenarios, not one has been exercised 
since the establishment of the National Level Exercise program.  Additionally, escalating 
costs continue to draw criticism to the NLE program.  Wermuth of the RAND 
Corporation commented in 2006 shortly after TOPOFF 3 was conducted for 
approximately $21 million dollars, “exercises could be done in 30 cities for the price of a 
single two-city TOPOFF.”90  As an example, the cost of all TOPOFF 3 expenditure line 
items (in 2005 dollars) is provided below.  Consideration for future NLE planning should 
focus on the high cost of subcontractors and consultant as well as the rapidly escalating 
costs of the full-scale exercise.  Expenditure calculations and information of this detail 
are not readily available to the public, probably because DHS and other participating 
agencies would find it difficult to validate the use of taxpayer money on this scale 
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Table 1.   TOPOFF 3 Expenditure Line Items 
 Provided below are overviews of each of the fifteen National Planning Scenarios.  
The distribution between potential terrorist activities and natural disasters remains highly 
relevant to our preparedness as a nation.  Current policy emphasizes a wide range of 
terrorists attacks (12 of 15 scenarios) as opposed to only three natural disasters including 













Figure 3.  National Planning Scenarios 
B. NATIONAL LEVEL EXERCISE:  DIRECTED PARTICIPATION 
 Since the inception of the National Exercise Program, FEMA has held 
responsibility for implementing the annual National Level Exercise.  As noted above, the 
new direction of DHS exercise policy involves reaching out to local level officials and 
responders in hopes of progressively building America’s national response capabilities 
towards a culminating NLE every two years.  However, what remains relevant and 
stagnant is that FEMA still operates according to the all-hazards approach exercised 
within the federally dominating and terror-centric National Planning Scenarios.  In efforts 
to understand what affect the new exercise vision will have and how it will resonate with 
the American public it is important to understand the growth and results of past exercises. 
 The first steps to counterbalance the dependency of national level exercises 
focusing solely on terrorism situations have been taken by DHS Secretary Janet 
Napolitano.  Her desire to stress more frequent, smaller-scale drills, tabletops, and 
functional exercises will positively resonate with local level officials and responders.  By 
providing increased opportunities for interaction and collaboration, DHS can effectively 
spread best practices more often than during an annual overarching federally imposing 
national exercise oriented around the development of senior federal officials.  These 
objective focused drills may also contribute to breaking down the jurisdictional concerns 
that have historically plague the NLE system.  Despite a promising outlook for 
interaction with lower levels of government and response, participating elements must 
also be weary of exercise fatigue while attempting to balance limited time and resources.  
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“Exercise fatigue is exacerbated when exercise activities do not contribute to appreciable 
improvements in intergovernmental coordination, exercise policies, plans, or emergency 
response performance.”91 
 Despite FEMA spending $218 million dollars over the past five years on national 
level exercises to incorporate all levels of government and the private sector, formidable 
challenges and impediments still block federal, state, local and even tribal participation 
efforts. The NEP implementation plan is binding on the federal executive branch but does 
not mandate exercise participation by sub-national units of government.”92  This creates 
an emergency response community where only selective units or localities that can adapt 
to federally driven exercise requirements gain an opportunity to meet and interact with 
federal officials and evaluate their own capabilities under real-time conditions.  For 
example, the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), funding, 
exercise flexibility and lengthy planning schedules all hinder our collective national 
preparedness. 
 The HSEEP is a federally driven emergency exercise response framework that 
developed following domestic terror attacks in 1995 and 2001.  The purpose of the 
HSEEP is to provide common exercise policy and program guidance that constitutes the 
national standard for homeland security exercises.93  As part of a five volume series 
produced by DHS to administer and evaluate national exercises, the HSEEP has been 
criticized for maintaining significant emphasis on federal officials during catastrophic 
exercises and ignoring the efforts of state and local level responders.  The HSEEP can 
even alienate federal agencies as “no explicit statutory or executive authority that 
compels federal agencies to use the HSEEP method has ever been identified.”94  More 
importantly the HSEEP further restricts participation across all levels of government as 
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exercises paid for with funds obtained through the DHS Homeland Security Grant 
Program (HSGP) must be managed and executed in accordance with HSEEP regulations.  
 Exercise participants who choose to avoid obligatory federal funding are often 
faced with respective budget concerns when considering whether to participate in larger, 
federally dominated exercises. 
In the Oregon venue of TOPOFF 4, the City of Portland worked on the 
exercise for two years prior to the Full-Scale Exercise, and spent more 
than $10 million dollars.  Of that total, Urban Area Security Initiative 
grants (a regionally focused component of the Homeland Security Grant 
Program) covered between $6 and $8 million dollars, leaving the city to 
pay more than $2.5 million dollars. 
Non-federal exercise participants must leverage the cost of exercise participation against 
the probability that any financial or personnel investments may derail their ongoing area 
specific emergency preparedness program.  As Perrow argues, participation in federally 
regulated and evaluated exercises may prove valuable, as municipal and local leaders 
“get a chance to see another’s point of view, establish personal contacts and build 
trust.”95  The downside to collaboration with DHS and federal entities for lower level 
responders is that opportunities to interact during the exercise and design process may be 
limited.  “One observer described DHS interactions as a directive process, with DHS 
providing the direction.”96 
 National Level Exercises have also been criticized as evolutions designed to ready 
top government officials and political appointees for crisis management roles in the event 
the unthinkable happens during their tenure.  Typical political appointments last between 
18 months and two years during which an official may be provided a single opportunity 
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belief that exercises are designed for responders, “the general intention of an NLE is to 
support government officers’ preparations for managing national crisis, and 
accountability of those who support them.”97 
 The top-down approach to exercises and national preparedness evolutions in 
which DHS interacts with state and local level responders is also evident when 
considering exercise flexibility and coordination efforts.  “Many hospitals, police and fire 
departments cannot meet the level of demand a disaster or large-scale emergency places 
on them.”98  Exercises also tend to interrupt day-to-day routines and hinder the 
availability and maintenance of public services.  “In particular, state, territorial, local and 
tribal entities that wish to participate in an NLE must allocate resources through their 
respective budget processes well in advance of their participation, or risk disrupting the 
regular duties of available responders.”99  To coincide with budget alterations, larger 
federal exercises often demand that state and local level responders reconfigure their 
respective calendars to accommodate federal exercise activity.  Even at the federal level, 
“agencies are expected to shape their participation to fit the themes and schedules of NLE 
scenarios”100 “As a common foundation for exercise development, the scenarios reduce 
the possibility that agencies exercising the same basic type of event will exercise greatly 
different consequences which may lead to vastly different capability requirements and 
preparedness expectations.”101  As a result of the burdening requirements for planning, 
coordination, money, and personnel in the participation of national level exercises, state 
and local level responders are not precluded, yet encouraged to develop their own 
scenarios to supplement the National Planning Scenarios.102 
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C. A FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION 
 According to the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (February 
2010), “exercises provide a vital tool for homeland security personnel, from first 
responders to senior officials, to practice operational activities and decision making 
processes in a realistic but risk-free environment.”103  The high costs of some exercises 
are capable of communicating the importance of a particular national capability and may 
even demonstrate how actively funneling resources into an exercise actually improves 
our preparedness.  Yet, in reality, annually conducting national level exercises by 
drawing on the limited resources of participating entities burdens society with social, 
economic, and political costs aside from the necessary financial costs.  Exercises are 
necessary to test our capabilities and uncover our vulnerabilities, yet the costly 
administration and focus of our efforts have been misguided according to perceived risks, 
undermined by political influence, coerced by exercise manipulation, and infrequently 
reported in the media. 
 Failing to plan and administer exercises to maintain our preparedness on all levels 
is politically unsustainable and even more so unacceptable in an American society still 
clinging to the hope that an attack comparable to the scope and magnitude of 9/11 is no 
longer a possibility.  Given the potential social disruption and escalating economic costs 
if an incident were to actually occur, our only reasonable option is to invest in exercise 
activity to test our response forces.  This logic raises the subsequent questions of how 
much and how often to invest to actually improve security and ensure an adequate 
response capability.  FEMA has historically invested over $218 million since 2005 in 
exercises alone, which led DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano to conclude that “drills have 
grown into unrealistic, costly, and over-scripted productions which have evolved into an 
elaborate game rather than opportunities for officials to work through problems.”104 
 For example, the original NLE 2010 was scheduled to test our nation’s abilities to 
handle and respond to the detonation of a nuclear device in a major U.S. city.  The city 
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selected and planned for was Las Vegas, NV, where the epicenter of the blast would have 
been Las Vegas Boulevard, a social and economic playground for many Americans.  
Under political pressure from Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.), who was 
strongly backed by casino and business interests, the Obama Administration cancelled 
and subsequently relocated the exercise to Indianapolis, Indiana.  Senator Reid cited that 
an exercise of that caliber (a nuclear detonation) would frighten away tourists and 
“unacceptably harm” the region’s battered economy.105  The intention of NLE 10 was to 
simulate a nuclear explosion, involve over 10,000 emergency responders and even 
incorporate the use of military forces at an estimated cost of $15 million dollars of 
taxpayer money.  As a result of political and economic sensitivities, “FEMA announced 
only four months before that it would scale back the exercise to focus on what could be 
done without state and local participation, settling on a largely Washington-based series 
of table-top drills and contingency operations.”106  This example demonstrates the federal 
bearing and control over exercises and how political and economic pressures are capable 
of manipulating exercise schedules at the expense of state and local officials and 
responders.  The collective efforts of Nevada officials as well as the financial resources 
committed were essentially wasted as years of planning and coordination evaporated 
under a last minute federal directive. 
 According to the DHS Inspector General April 2009 report, “National Exercise 
Program (NEP) managers describe securing sufficient federal support for TOPOFF/NLEs 
as a primary challenge in establishing a national exercise program.”107  Federal 
challenges include the assignment of a representative executive to the executive steering 
committee, projected allocation of resources and the imposing focus on principally DHS 
objectives.  “Additionally, when agency leadership roles are simulated, or played by  
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officials who would not lead response efforts to an actual incident, the effectiveness of 
exercises as a tool to enhance preparedness among officials with principle response 
functions may be questioned.”108 
 Conversely, state and local entities encounter difficulties with exercise 
participation due typically to late notifications during the planning process and unclear 
benchmarks and guidelines for participation.  Some state and local level officials also 
insist that in order to ensure maximum participation value, they need to be considered not 
only earlier in the planning process, but also earlier in the exercise design stage.  
 The means by which we evaluate and generate data to improve future 
preparedness is another important aspect of national exercises in determining whether 
Americans realize any security value from the significant financial investments required.  
The focus of these concerns remains our ability to stress, test, and operate our collective 
response capabilities to their maximum potential.  However, “some emergency planners 
and state officials say they fear that as the government cuts cost, it may dumb down the 
test so that participants will pass them more easily.”109  The scope, costs, and actual 
probability of attack given certain parts of the country are all contributing factors that 
may inadvertently expand or contract the purpose and reality of an exercise.  Likewise, an 
ability to evaluate exercise participants is necessary to gauge success and effectively 
contribute to post-exercise analysis, observations, and recommendations.  For example, 
more than 650 evaluators participated in TOPOFF 4, yet the majority of evaluators “did 
not complete the National Exercise Division (NED) evaluator training, or familiarize 
themselves with the exercise plan, scenario, missions, policies, and procedures specific to 
their assigned location.”110  In fact, “some of the evaluators said that they were selected 
by their departments and agencies to serve as evaluators shortly before the start of 
TOPOFF 4 exercise.”111  Without sufficient knowledge and a relevant understanding of 
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exercise objectives, poorly trained evaluators detract from the purpose of critically 
assessing officials and responders and may fail to uncover systemic vulnerabilities. 
 The amount of data generated from exercises can have a huge impact on a 
particular unit or group of officials, but only if that data is organized, accurately 
represented and accessible. 
Since the first Top Officials exercise in 2000, neither a process for 
tracking weaknesses and how those weaknesses were resolved, nor a 
method for identifying and analyzing trends in corrective actions or 
significant lessons learned has been established.  As a result, federal, state, 
local, and territorial agencies were unclear regarding the implementation 
of suggested improvements following preparedness exercises.112 
The current standard for managing DHS exercise after action reports (AARs) is to 
designate all reports as For Official Use Only (FOUO), because they are considered to 
contain potentially sensitive information, and to distribute them under loan conditions to 
a limited number of government departments and agencies.  This practice inhibits the 
ability of DHS to communicate information about these exercises to the American public.  
As the DHS IG reported, “DHS has not yet developed an effective process to disseminate 
TOPOFF/NLE AARs, lessons learned, and best practices to a broad national 
audience.”113  In attempts to communicate exercise results to a national audience, 
National Exercise Division personnel conducted a 1-day National After-Action 
Conference in which only 142 homeland security officials participated in person or via 
webcast.   Aside from national level conferences, the primary way to access TOPOFF 
lessons learned and best practices is through the Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
website (LLIS.gov) which requires citizens to endure a screening process focused on 
validating a applicants eligibility and necessity to access the information. 
 Some additional concerns about the applicability of the National Planning 
Scenarios and their use as the framework for culminating National Level Exercises are 
the failures to generate informative public affairs reporting, an increased focus on 
developing federal officials vice responders and a lack of exercise reporting transparency. 
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 This past May, the 2010 National Level Exercise Eagle Horizon took place in 
Indianapolis, Indiana, Los Angeles, and Washington D.C., yet failed to generate any 
significant press or reporting available to the public.  Typically these worst-case 
catastrophic attack scenarios fail to generate public interests, as many components of the 
exercise are often watered-down or reduced to notional tabletop analysis of forces, 
potential damage incurred, and response capabilities.  Eagle Horizon 2010 should have 
been different.  This scenario involved the exercise detonation of a nuclear weapon in the 
heart of Indianapolis coupled with related terrorist threats to the metropolitan hubs of Los 
Angeles and Washington D.C.  As noted in Homeland Security Watch, “this exercise had 
been scheduled for over two years, with millions of dollars spent, and thousands of DHS 
and component members participating.”114  For a domestic terrorism drill designed to test 
our basic continuity of government abilities, the importance of communicating this 
results-based knowledge to the American public cannot be understated.  The failure to 
emphasis public affairs and public communication is a missed opportunity for DHS to 
validate its sizeable expenses and uses of taxpayer money.  The ultimate question for a 
federal official remains:  what have we gained from executing Eagle Horizon 2010?  On 
the surface it appears the public has failed to learn anything about the drill or our national 
preparedness efforts. 
 Lastly, most national level or federally directed exercises maintain a certain 
degree of confidentiality either throughout the exercise or afterwards.  This often only 
contributes to an inability to communicate with the public and other relevant emergency 
responders.  “Many exercises are classified or have classified elements probably difficult 
to be examined by outsiders.”115 The lack of available information from which to plan 
future exercises or tailor present day response forces seems not only to impede 
communication, but also to waste the resources and efforts of so many involved.  
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 National level exercises continue to endure criticism for various reasons.  The 
cumulative effect of high cost, low participation rates, inaccessible AARs and lessons 
learned, and a prohibitive communication architecture all supports the argument that 
bigger is not better.  The direct relationship between the size of an exercise and the 
complexity involved in successfully administering, implementing and evaluating seems 
to create more vulnerabilities than can possibly be uncovered.  The forward focus of the 
Department of Homeland Security and its subordinate entity, FEMA, should be to 
address working relationships all along the spectrum of emergency response and 
capabilities.  Federal officials should stress engagement with lower local levels of 
government and assume a role more typical of a force enabler.  In other words, big 
government should tackle national response efforts by providing what is needed to state, 
local and territorial personnel.  An effort should be undertaken to standardize procedures 
for response, joint activities, data generation and reporting.  The assumption that National 
Planning Scenarios are addressing our critical vulnerabilities is misguided.  National 
endeavors train and qualify federal officials or political appointees to momentarily 
assume political responsibility during chaotic events.  State and local governments should 
be charged with organizing and mitigating the specific effects of a catastrophic event 
relative to their AOR as our limited national resources must be closely guarded and 

















IV. CONCLUSION:  THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 
 The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSRR), published in 
February 2010, serves as both a document intent on rallying efforts to secure the 
homeland while also highlighting shortfalls within DHS and its bureaucratic working 
relationships with partner agencies.  The QHSRR focuses both on present day threats and 
the framework for American strategic response by emphasizing the Homeland Security 
Enterprise (HSE) in pursuit of stronger national security and improved response 
capability.  Since appointment in 2009, Secretary Napolitano has ushered in a productive 
era at DHS in which she continues to focus on maturing and strengthening the (HSE).  
The goal of the HSE is to ensure a shared awareness and understanding of risks and 
threats, build capable communities, and create unity of effort to underpin our collective 
goals of preventing terrorism and enhancing our national security.116 
The term “enterprise” refers to the collective efforts and shared 
responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, 
and private-sector partners—as well as individuals, families, and 
communities to maintain critical homeland security capabilities.  It 
recognizes the diverse risks, needs, and priorities of these different 
stakeholders, and connotes a broad-based community with a common 
interest in the public safety and well-being of America and American 
society.117 
 Respective of the HSE, this thesis has sought out to gauge DHS’ historical public 
communications performance by analyzing two of its highest profile projects, the 
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and the National Exercise Program (NEP).  
As a result of extensive top-down federal control and regulation, both case studies within 
this thesis examined the extent to which Americans are unreceptive of threat warnings  
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and security based exercises.  Considerable debate over the effectiveness of color-coded 
systems and large, all-encompassing security based exercises continues within both 
academic and government settings. 
 In this final chapter, we will first review the results of the cases examined in 
earlier chapters and then address how best to maintain the national will and commitment 
towards homeland security.  Additionally, we will analyze the new direction of DHS 
exercises and how the shift from larger to smaller more frequent exercises can better 
benefit officials and responders at the state and local levels.  This chapter will 
recommend that to reverse a culture of disinterest in homeland security affairs, DHS 
officials should embark on a public relations outreach program in order to clarify and 
more effectively translate the importance of homeland security efforts.  In support of 
Secretary Napolitano's new exercise direction this chapter will further recommend that 
national level exercises must continually shift the focus for preparation and coordination 
from the federal to the state level and emphasis a state centric regional approach to 
emergency and crisis management. 
 In Chapter II, the HSAS was critiqued as a broad national system that has failed to 
resonate with the American public because its vague warnings and general threat 
information rarely apply outside of federal departments and agencies.  A historical review 
of the evolution of the HSAS reveals a continuous evaluation process in which the entire 
response spectrum from local to national levels have recognized shortfalls and 
continually attempted to implement recommendations to improve public communication 
and interest in Homeland Security threats.  As a result of vague warnings and 
indiscriminate color shifts before, during and after a terrorist attack or incident, the 
American public has lost confidence in risk-averse politically appointed government 
officials that undermine the credibility of the HSAS.  Improved threat credibility and 
information transparency are vital for DHS to reengage the American community and 
restore public readiness to acceptable and sustainable levels.  The HSAS remains a 
relevant and vital means for DHS officials to communicate with responders and the 
American public, yet, its general threat messages continue to dilute the importance of 
preparation and response during times of crisis.  The HSAS, supported by both threat 
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advisories and information bulletins has been appropriately designed yet poorly executed.  
DHS officials must eliminate the green threat advisory level, as America's threat posture 
post 9/11 has never operated under low risk of terrorist attack.  Additionally, the limited 
use of homeland security advisories and bulletins to communicate across all levels of 
government must be reemphasized in efforts to priorities concerns, threats, and response 
capabilities.  
 Chapter III examined the National Exercise Program (NEP) by addressing the 
significance of annual White House directed operations-based National Level Exercises 
(NLE) within the context of DHS’s physical activity communication efforts.  The central 
drawbacks to NLE remain a persistent focus on emergency scenarios that are unlikely to 
occur, an emphasis on federally directed activity, and an inability to communicate lessons 
learned security information to the public.  In recognition that exercises are necessary to 
determine the appropriate balance of safety, security and capability, this chapter further 
argued that exercises have become increasingly complicated, costly, and unrealistic.  The 
future success of NLEs is directly related to the value and responsibility assigned to 
regional and local level responders and officials.  The decentralization of exercise 
regulation and the elimination of various bureaucratic obstacles to participation in larger 
federally driven exercise will contribute to an improved readiness posture across all 
levels of government and throughout American communities. 
 Secretary Napolitano’s August 2010 National Exercise Program directive has 
revamped the manner and frequency in which we test our national capabilities and has 
created additional opportunities for federal organizations to incorporate state and local 
level responders.  However, the current problems, which hinder both the Homeland 
Security Advisory System (HSAS) and the National Exercise Program (NEP) still persist 
and inhibit our nation’s ability to respond to and recover from terrorist attacks and 
naturals disasters.  The HSAS is the premier verbal communication tool used by DHS to 
convey security threats and warnings, yet under its current structure it continues to lack 
the trust, confidence and interest of the American public.  The NEP is the most effective 
and costly form of physical activity communication utilized by DHS yet as the provided 
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research has shown, it has become far too broad, complicated and federally driven to 
effectively incorporate and capitalize on the value of state and local level officials.    
A. IMPROVING THE HSAS AND MAINTAINING THE NATIONAL WILL 
TO PROTECT AMERICA 
 The success of the HSE depends entirely on its strategic approach to security, 
which is reliant on shared security awareness among all stakeholders.  DHS must 
reconnect with the American public in order to recapture the respect and genuine interests 
of citizens willing to contribute to national security.  The collective efforts of American 
citizens is the key to building stronger communities, reducing security vulnerabilities, 
improving overall preparedness levels, and strengthening local level response to natural 
disasters and terrorist attacks. 
 Historical DHS communication with the American public via the HSAS has 
created a culture of disinterest due mainly to the repetitive generalization of threat 
information and warnings during times of crisis.  One recommendation to overturn 
negative public perceptions of DHS and lessen the divide between federal and lower-
level officials is for DHS to embark on a nationwide public relations outreach campaign.  
An outreach campaign focused on public communications would allow DHS officials to 
actively communicate security objectives and capabilities beyond bureaucratic 
government documents in order to better reveal and explain the focus of DHS, which is 
the third largest federal agency with over 200,000 American employees.  A public 
relations outreach program comparable to any of the U.S. military services would create 
an environment for DHS officials to rationalize their seemingly inflated budgets and 
justify the growing costs and requirements necessary to secure the homeland.  Imagine if 
the American public could one day become as interested and cognizant of DHS affairs as 
the American public has become to the exploits and service of the United States Marines.  
The Marines are successful because they promote a challenge to serve and fight on behalf 
of America.  DHS must reinvent its image by challenging Americans defend America by 
serving in any of its various agencies. 
 High-level DHS officials should personally endorse the public relations outreach 
program by participating in public events, commercials, and exercises, though the names 
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and faces of its employees, as showcased on DHS.gov, should be utilized to communicate 
the message of the HSE.  By using everyday government employees (which are our 
friends, neighbors, and relatives) to carry the message of enduring security, DHS officials 
can better substantiate and personalize threat warnings that may be more effective at 
relating to the American public.  Incorporating non-executive DHS employees into an 
outreach program will also diminish the directive nature of large overarching federal 
bureaucracies.  Everyday citizens working on behalf of DHS will be able to better 
humanize the responsibility and necessity of protecting the homeland while also 
educating the American public about the various agencies that comprise DHS. 
 An outreach program of this scope will allow DHS officials to effectively “call to 
duty” American citizens interested in protecting their country.  This is an opportunity not 
only to educate the public on security concerns, but to also make DHS jobs and training 
more selective and competitive.  The power of personalizing the roles that everyday 
Americans are playing in the defense of our ports, borders and airports must be 
showcased in efforts to continuously raise security awareness and honestly communicate 
with the American public. 
 At present, the American public only hears from DHS officials in times of crisis 
or threat.  By taking the initiative and actively promoting the daily endeavors of DHS 
employees in defense of America, federal officials can begin to rebuild the trust, 
confidence, and integrity essential for public communication.  DHS is often the scapegoat 
for security breaches and concerns yet its must not be viewed as another extraneous and 
expensive government agency.  All efforts should be made to overturn the present day 
culture of disinterest, and the first step is refining what the message is and how it can be 
most effectively communicated to the average American citizen. 
B. NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM: DECENTRALIZED UNITY OF 
EFFORT 
 The past ten years of congressionally mandated National Level Exercises have 
only marginally improved American response capabilities to natural disasters and 
terrorist attacks.  To relate the lack of catastrophic terrorist attacks on American soil to 
our improved awareness and capabilities would be unjustified, as our enemies remain in 
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attack mode and their recurring failures have largely been a result of their incompetence 
and faulty execution (Northwest Flight 253 Underwear Bomber, Times Square Bomber, 
Foiled European Plot).  Historical evidence indicates that NLEs, while serving to test our 
response abilities, have more often than not revealed additional vulnerabilities.  Many of 
these new found vulnerabilities stem from the inclusion of additional bureaucratic layers 
of government intervention and protocol.  Heavy federal involvement continues to hinder 
state abilities to further coordinate among regional and local level officials.  The NLE 
Program remains vital to our homeland defense, yet specifically it remains necessary 
solely for the training and development of high-level federal officials who are politically 
responsible to handle national emergencies as they occur. 
 The historical emphasis on federal management of national incidents has widened 
the divide between state/local level responders and authoritative federal entities.  The 
NEP must continue to focus on the extent of federal authority and resources involved in 
security exercises while shifting the emphasis of training and response to the state level.  
Exercises of national importance should focus on an individual states’ ability to respond 
and operate along the same guidelines used when a governor declares a state of 
emergency.  In the event that a crisis or terrorist attack overwhelms a particular state and 
its capabilities, the next step in the process should involve a regional response agreement 
between bordering states vice national participation.  A state should request national 
intervention during a crisis only when an event or scenario exceeds the capabilities of a 
state or actionable intelligence indicates that negative ramifications exist outside of state 
or regional control.  A shift towards state focused training will ultimately improve 
national preparedness by enabling states to better conserve precious resources and 
manpower while also providing DHS an opportunity to focus on standardizing response 
capabilities through regional frameworks. 
 The August 2010 National Exercise Program directive issued by DHS Secretary 
Napolitano serves to increase the number and frequency of smaller exercise yet still 
functions under the premise of federal control and regulation.  The same recurring 
exercise issues will resurface regardless of the number of exercise scheduled, stated 
objectives, or the volume of participants evaluated.  Under a federally dominated system, 
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state and local level responders will encounter difficulty as planning will always be 
costly, untimely, directive and unsatisfying to the various objectives of each nonfederal 
participant.  The QHSRR calls for efforts to institutionalize homeland security planning 
as current planning systems address only portions of overall homeland security activities, 
and require better integration across all levels of government with intergovernmental 
entities.118  Additional recommendations call for the implementation of best practices 
across the HSE in stark recognition that despite ten years of NLE experience, the 
homeland security apparatus has yet to devise a means or establish an overarching 
authority capable of implementing lessons learned to address security vulnerabilities.119   
 In order to achieve a secure and protected homeland, DHS must produce a 
common operating picture without over-regulating state activities and response 
capabilities.  Response efforts remain local events and the most efficient way to 
coordinate capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all 
hazards in a way that balances risk with resources and need is to return power and 
discretion to the state level with federal resources on demand and minimize political 
influence within the process of defending the homeland. 120 
C. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, to alleviate the historically poor performance of public 
communications, the Department of Homeland Security should focus its efforts on 
revamping the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and the National Exercise 
Program (NEP).  To date, DHS has not been able to earn the respect of the public or local 
officials, and that means that many Americans are not paying attention to important threat 
warnings and security based exercises.  This ultimately means our homeland security is 
suffering and American citizens remain vulnerable to future terror attacks.  The security 
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of the homeland remains vulnerable as both high profile programs lack consistent public 
interest and engagement.  As a result of highly centralized federal management and 
execution, both programs continually fail to convey the importance of federal efforts to 
local levels of government and American citizens.  The strength of America and our core 
capability to react and respond to terror attacks and natural disasters resides with the least 
influential working class Americans who protect our homes, schools, neighborhoods, and 
communities.  I find that both programs are useful and necessary, but both can be 
improved by decentralizing the national exercise framework and communication efforts 
to local level officials who can better tailor information and response efforts pertinent to 
their communities.  As the most important component of disaster relief and response, 
local level officials, who are typically overshadowed by national level personnel, can 
more effectively utilize federal exercise money and communicate threats to the American 
public than DHS personnel can. 
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